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26 April 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
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25X1 25X1	Congo: Katanga President Tshombé's walkout from the political conference at Coquilhatville will render largely is effectual any agreements reached there, and is a major suback to efforts to achieve Congo unity. Tshombé left the conference on 25 April after attacking the recent agreemed between President Kasavubu and the UN Command which called for the withdrawal from the Congo of all foreign ad visers except those invited by Kasavubu to remain. Tshombé's walkout coincided with indications that the Congolese army factions in Leopoldville and Stanleyville are themselves engaged in negotiations concerning a political solution in the Congo. pro-Gizenga officers in Orientale Province have urged the formation by early May of a central government which they could 'follow,''i.e., presumably one includin representatives of Gizenga. In line with Gizenga's oftenexpressed position, these officers also demanded the receive of the Congolese parliament. The continued failure	en- et- ent - OK e - e e on- e
25X1	of Congolese political leaders to make progress toward a Congo confederation may lead to increased political activity by the various army factions.	25X1 25X1 ty DOE DOE
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	Argentina:	President F	'rondizi's req	 ıest for	the resigna-	25X1
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APPY Ved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700010001-7 of lowered real wages. A close collaborator of Alsogaray, Roberto Aleman, the economic counselor of the Argentine Embassy in Washington, has been appointed the new minister of economy. 25X1 26 Apr 61 DAILY BRIEF 25X1

The Collapse of the French Military Insurrection

The military rising in Algeria ended yesterday almost as quickly and quietly as it started. Paratroop forces were withdrawn from Oran and Constantine during the day and by midnight police and regular army units loyal to Paris had moved into Algiers. Within two hours, and after only sporadic fighting, Generals Challe, Salan, and Jouhaud, the leaders of the insurrection, had left the government buildings in trucks loaded with paratroops, according to press reports. The whereabouts of the generals is uncertain, although they probably went first to the Foreign Legion base at Zeralda near Algiers. Other units actively engaged in the insurrection reportedly returned to their barracks.

The ending of the insurrection was largely the result of De Gaulle's tough stand and the popular backing he received. The US Embassy in Paris comments that public opinion rallied in a more determined way than in either May 1958 or January 1960. There is reason to believe that this popular support for De Gaulle was reflected in the behavior of those military units in Algeria predominately composed of conscripts. Although few of those units were willing to fire on the paratroops, they apparently gave no positive support to the rising. It is also possible that it was the demonstrations of popular support for De Gaulle which prevented any moves in metropolitan France by forces opposed to the government from materializing. When naval units at Toulon and regular army units in Germany responded to the government's orders of 25 April, the insurrectionists probably realized how narrow their support was.

De Gaulle is publicly committed to try the leaders of the insurrection for treason. The bulk of the military establishment, however, is likely to come in for high praise from De Gaulle, who is eager to press ahead with his plans to develop a modern national defense force.

Once the smoke clears De Gaulle will probably consider that his victory over the insurgents has given him a new mandate for negotiations with the Provisional Algerian Government (PAG) and additional flexibility once talks are under way. The leadership of the PAG, obviously concerned that the insurrection would be successful, sent word to Paris that it would be receptive

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25X1	inta. The PAG was also reportedly ready to issue a statement signifying its willingness to open negotiations with France on the understanding that parallel negotiations would not be con-
	ducted with a rival Moslem group, but held up the statement
	so as not to hamper De Gaulle during the insurrection. Despite
	the improved prospects for opening negotiations, however. the
	two sides remain divided on many substantive issues.
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Argentine Minister of Economy Resigns

Argentine President Frondizi stated in an official communique that his acceptance of the resignation of Minister of Economy Alsogaray merely signified the completion of the initial phase of the US-backed stabilization program and that the government was resolved to complete the program, which would now emphasize expanded economic development. Alsogaray refused to comment on the reasons behind the Alsogaray had request. made too many enemies among the military, Frondizi's Intransigent Radical party, the conservatives, and liberal groups who criticize the hardships the stabilization program has caused for labor. His resignation had been rumored for several months. Other resignations are being submitted by key members of Alsogaray's economic team and Central Bank officials, according to the American Embassy in Buenos Aires.

The press reports that War Secretary Fraga, who was the central figure in opposing former Army Commander in Chief Toranzo Montero in late March, has also tendered his resignation and that others may follow. Foreign Minister Taboada may be replaced by Donato del Carril, who has been ambassador to the US since October 1959.

One financial official believes that Frondizi's action was unrelated to military pressures—which have frequently been aimed at Alsogaray—but that it may be connected with new foreign policy developments. Presidents Frondizi and Quadros, during their meeting on 21-22 April at the Brazilian border town of Uruguaiana, emphasized economic development in one of their joint declarations.

Roberto Aleman, who has been appointed minister of economy, strongly supports the US-backed stabilization program and Alsogaray's policies. He reportedly is expected to intensify Alsogaray's efforts to balance the budget and transfer state enterprises to private ownership as a means of reducing the federal deficit, the primary source of inflation.

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Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700010001-7 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director

